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Abstract—Methods from convex optimization are widely used as building blocks for deep learning algorithms. However, the reasons for their
empirical success are unclear, since modern convolutional networks (convnets), incorporating rectifier units and max-pooling, are neither
smooth nor convex. Standard guarantees therefore do not apply. This paper provides the first convergence rates for gradient descent on
rectifier convnets. The proof utilizes the particular structure of rectifier networks which consists in binary active/inactive gates applied on top
of an underlying linear network. The approach generalizes to max-pooling, dropout and maxout. In other words, to precisely the neural
networks that perform best empirically. The key step is to introduce gated games, an extension of convex games with similar convergence
properties that capture the gating function of rectifiers. The main result is that rectifier convnets converge to a critical point at a rate controlled
by the gated-regret of the units in the network. Corollaries of the main result include: (i) a game-theoretic description of the representations
learned by a neural network; (ii) a logarithmic-regret algorithm for training neural nets; and (iii) a formal setting for analyzing conditional
computation in neural nets that can be applied to recently developed models of attention.
Index Terms—convex optimization, deep learning, error backpropagation, game theory, no-regret learning.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning algorithms have yielded impressive perfor-
mance across a range of tasks, including object and voice
recognition [1]. The workhorse underlying deep learning is
error backpropagation [2]–[4] – a decades old algorithm that
yields state-of-the-art performance on massive labeled datasets
when combined with recent innovations such as rectifiers and
dropout [5].
Backprop is gradient descent plus the chain rule. Gradient
descent has convergence guarantees in settings that are smooth
or convex or both. However, modern convnets are neither
smooth nor convex. Although it is well-known that convnets
are not convex, it is perhaps under-emphasized that the spec-
tacular recent results obtained by convnets on benchmarks
such as ImageNet [6] rely on architectures that are not smooth.
Starting with AlexNet in 2012, every winner of the ImageNet
classification challenge has used rectifier (also known as recti-
linear) activation functions [7]–[10].
Rectifiers and max-pooling are non-smooth functions that
are used in essentially all modern convnets [11]–[16]. In fact,
the representational power of rectifier nets derives precisely
from their nondifferentiability: the number of nondifferentiable
boundaries in the parameter space grows exponentially with
depth [17]. It follows that none of the standard convergence
guarantees from the optimization literature apply to modern
convnets.
In this paper, we provide the first convergence rates for
convolutional networks with rectifiers and max-pooling. To do
so we introduce a new class of gated games which generalize
the convex games studied by Stoltz and Lugosi in [18]. We
reformulate learning in convnets as gated games and adapt
results on convergence to correlated equilibria from convex to
gated games.
1.1 Open Questions in the Foundations of Deep Learning
Theoretical questions about deep learning can be loosely
grouped into four categories:
Q1. Representational power
The set of functions approximated by neural networks have
been extensively studied. Early results show that neural net-
works with a single hidden layer are universal function ap-
proximators [19], [20]. More recently, researchers have focused
on the role of depth and rectifiers in function approximation
[21]–[23].
Q2. Generalization guarantees
Standard guarantees from VC-theory apply to neural nets,
although these are quite loose [24], [25]. Recent work by Hardt
et al shows that the convergence rate of stochastic gradient
methods have implications for generalization bounds in both
convex and nonconvex settings [26]. Unfortunately, their re-
sults rely on a smoothness assumption1 that does not hold
for rectifiers or max-pooling. Thus, although suggestive, the
results do not apply to modern convnets. Feng et al have
initiated a promising direction based on ensemble robustness
is [27], although robustness cannot be evaluated analytically.
A related problem is to better understand regularization
methods such as dropout [28], [29]. Regret-bounds for dropout
have been found in the setting of prediction with expert advice
[30]. However, it is unclear how to extend these results to
neural nets.
Q3. Local and global minima
The third problem is to understand how far the critical points
found by backpropagation are from local minima and the
global minimum. The problem is challenging since neural
networks are not convex. There has been theoretical work
studying conditions under which gradient descent converges
1. Function f : H → R is smooth if ∀w,w′ ∈ H, ∃β > 0 such that
‖∇ f(w)−∇ f(w′)‖ ≤ β‖w −w′‖. Rectifiers are not smooth for any β.
2to local minima on nonconvex problems [31], [32]. The as-
sumptions required for these results are quite strong, and
include smoothness assumptions that do not hold for rectifiers.
It has also been observed that saddles slow down training,
even when the algorithm does not converge to a saddle point;
designing algorithms that avoid saddles is an area of active
research [33].
Recent work by Choromanska et al suggests that most local
optima in neural nets have error rates that are reasonably
close to the global optimum [34], [35]. Searching for good
local optima may therefore be of less practical importance than
ensuring rapid convergence.
Q4. Convergence rates
The last problem, and the focus of this paper, is to under-
stand the convergence of gradient-based methods on neural
networks. Speeding up the training time of neural nets is a
problem of enormous practical importance. Although there is
a large body of empirical work on optimizing neural nets, there
are no theoretical guarantees that apply to the methods used
to train rectifier convnets since they are neither smooth nor
convex.
Recent work has investigated the convergence of proxi-
mal methods for nonconvex nonsmooth problems [36], [37].
However computing prox- operators appears infeasible for
neural nets. Interesting results have been derived for variance-
reduced gradient optimization in the nonconvex setting [38]–
[40], although smoothness is still required.
1.2 Outline
Training modern convnets, with rectifiers and max-pooling,
entails searching over a rich subset of a universal class of
function approximators with a loss function that is neither
smooth nor convex. There is little hope of obtaining useful
convergence results at this level of generality. It is therefore
necessary to utilize the structure of rectifier networks.
Our strategy is to decompose neural nets into interacting
optimizers that are easier to analyze individually than the net
as a whole. In short, the strategy is to import techniques from
game theory into deep learning.
1.2.1 Utilizing network structure
We make two observations about neural network structure.
The first, section 2, is to reformulate linear networks as convex
games where the players are the units in the network. Although
the loss is not a convex function of the weights of the network;
it is a convex function of the weights of the individual players.
The observation connects the dynamics of games under no-
regret learning to the dynamics of linear networks under
backpropagation.
Linear networks are a special case. It is natural to ask
whether neural networks with nonlinearities are also convex
games. Unfortunately, the answer is no: introducing any non-
linearity breaks convexity.2 Although the situation seems hope-
less it turns out, remarkably, that game-theoretic convergence
results can be imported – despite nonconvexity – for precisely
the nonlinearities used in modern convnets.
The second observation, section 3.1, is that a rectifier net-
work is a linear network equipped with gates that control
2. In short, the “nonlinearity” f would have to be affine since we need
all linear combinations of f to be convex, including f(a) and −f(a) ∀a.
whether units are active for a given input. If a unit is inac-
tive during the feedforward sweep, it is also inactive during
backpropagation, and therefore does not update its weights.
This motivates generalizing convex games to gated games.
1.2.2 Gated games
In a classical game, each player chooses a series of actions and,
on each round, incurs a convex loss. The regret of a player is
the difference between its cumulative loss and what the cumu-
lative would have been had the player chosen the best action
in hindsight [41]. Players can be implemented with so-called
no-regret algorithms that minimize their loss relative to the
best action in hindsight. More precisely, a no-regret algorithm
has sublinear cumulative regret. The regret per round therefore
vanishes asymptotically.
Section 3 introduces gated games where players only incur a
convex loss on rounds for which they are active. After extend-
ing the definitions of regret and correlated equilibrium to gated
games, proposition 3 shows that if players follow no-gated-
regret strategies, then they converge to a correlated equilib-
rium. Gated players generalize the sleepy experts introduced
by Blum in [42], see also [43].
A useful technical tool is path-sum games. These are games
constructed over directed acyclic graphs with weighted edges.
Lemma 4 shows that path-sums encode the dynamics of the
feedforward and feedback sweeps of rectifier nets. Propo-
sition 5 shows that path-sum games are gated games and
proposition 6 extends the result to convolutional networks.
1.2.3 Summary of contribution
The main contributions of the paper are as follows:
C1. Theorem 1: Rectifier convnets converge to a critical point
under backpropagation at a rate controlled by the gated-
regret of the units in the network.
Corollary 1 specializes the result to gradient descent. To the
best of our knowledge, there are no previous convergence
rates applicable to neural nets with rectifier nonlinearities and
max-pooling. Finding conditions that guarantee convergence
to local minima is deferred to future work.
The results derive from a detailed analysis of the internal
structure of rectifer nets and their updates under backpropa-
gation. They require no new ideas regarding optimization in
general. Our methods provide the first rigorous explanation
for how methods designed for convex optimization improve
convergence rates on modern convnets. The results do not
apply to all neural networks: they hold for precisely the neural
networks that perform best empirically [7]–[16].
The philosophy underlying the paper is to decompose
training neural nets into two distinct tasks: communication and
optimization. Communication is handled by backpropagation
which sends the correct gradient information to players (units)
in the net. Optimization is handled locally by the individual
players. Note that although this philosophy is widely applied
when designing and implementing neural nets, it has been
under-utilized in the analysis of neural nets. The role of players
in a convnet is encapsulated in the Gated Forecaster setting,
Section 4. Our results provide a dictionary that translates
the guarantees applicable to any no-regret algorithm into a
convergence rate for the network as a whole.
C2. Reformulate neural networks as games.
The primary conceptual contribution of the paper is to connect
game theory to deep learning. An interesting consequence
3of the main result is corollary 2 which provides a compact
description of the weights learned by a neural network via
the signal underlying correlated equilibrium. More generally,
neural nets are a basic example of a game with a structured
communication protocol (the path-sums) which determines
how players interact [44]. It may be fruitful to investigate
broader classes of structured games.
It has been suggested that rectifiers perform well because
they are nonnegative homogeneous which has implications for
regularization [45] and robustness to changes in initialization
[23]. Our results provide a complementary explanation. Rec-
tifiers simultaneously (i) introduce a nonlinearity into neural
nets providing them with enormous representational power
and (ii) act as gates that select subnetworks of an underlying
linear neural network, so that convex methods are applicable
with guarantees.
C3. Logarithmic regret algorithm.
As a concrete application of the gated forecaster framework,
we adapt the Online Newton Step algorithm [46] to neural nets
and show it has logarithmic-regret, corollary 3. The resulting
algorithm approximates Newton’s method locally at the level
of individual units of the network – rather than globally for
the network as a whole. The local, unit-wise implementation
reduces computational complexity and sidesteps the tendency
of quasi-newton methods to approach saddle points.
C4. Conditional computation.
A secondary conceptual contribution is to introduce a frame-
work for conditional computation. Up to this point, we as-
sumed the gate is a fixed property of the game. Concretely,
gates correspond to rectifiers andmax-pooling in convolutional
networks – which are baked into the architecture before the
network is exposed to data. It is natural to consider optimizing
when players in a gated game are active, section 4.5.
Recent work along these lines has applied reinforcement
learning algorithms to find data-dependent dropout policies
[47], [48]. Conditional computation is closely related to models
of attention [49], [50]. Slightly further afield, long-short term
memories (LSTMs) and Gated Recurrent Units (GRUs) use
complicated sets of sigmoid-gates to control activity within
memory cells [51], [52]. Unfortunately the resulting architec-
tures are difficult to analyze; see [53] for a principled simplifi-
cation of recurrent neural network architectures motivated by
similar considerations to the present paper.
As a first step towards analyzing conditional computation
in neural nets, we introduce the Conditional Gate (CoG) setting.
CoGs are contextual bandits or contextual partial monitors that
optimize when sets of units are active. CoGs are a second
class of players that can be introduced into in neural games,
and may provide a useful tool when designing deep learning
algorithms.
1.2.4 Caveat
Neural nets are typically trained on minibatches sampled
i.i.d. from a dataset. In contrast, the analysis below provides
guarantees in adversarial settings. Our results are therefore
conservative. Extending the analysis to take advantage of
stochastic settings is an important open problem. However, it
is worth mentioning that neural nets are increasingly applied
to data that is not i.i.d. sampled. For example, adversarially
trained generative networks have achieved impressive perfor-
mance [54], [55]. Similarly, there has been spectacular progress
applying neural nets to reinforcement learning [56], [57].
Activity within a neural network is not i.i.d. even when the
inputs are, a phenomenon known as internal covariate shift
[58]. Two relevant developments are batch-normalization [58]
and optimistic mirror descent [59]–[61]. Batch normalization
significantly reduces the training time of neural nets by actively
reducing internal covariate shift. Optimistic mirror descent
takes advantage of the fact that all players in a game are
implementing no-regret learning to speed up convergence. It is
interesting to investigate whether reducing internal covariate
shift can be understood game-theoretically, and whether opti-
mistic learning algorithms can be adapted to neural networks.
1.3 Related work
A number of papers have brought techniques from convex
optimization into the analysis of neural networks. A line of
work initiated by Bengio in [62] shows that allowing the
learning algorithm to choose the number of hidden units can
convert neural network optimization in a convex problem, see
also [63]. A convex multi-layer architecture is developed in
[64], [65]. Although these methods are interesting, they have
not achieved the practical success of convnets. In this paper,
we analyze convnets as they are rather than proposing a more
tractable, but potentially less useful, model.
Game theory was developed to model interactions between
humans [66]. However, it may be more directly applicable as a
toolbox for analyzing machina economicus – that is, interacting
populations of algorithms that are optimizing objective func-
tions [67]. We go one step further, and develop a game-theoretic
analysis of the internal structure of backpropagation.
The idea of decomposing deep learning algorithms into
cooperating modules dates back to at least the work of Bot-
tou [68]. A related line of work modeling biological neural
networks from a game-theoretic perspective can be found in
[69]–[72].
2 WARMUP: LINEAR NETWORKS
The paper combines disparate techniques and notation from
game theory, convex optimization and deep learning, and is
therefore somewhat dense. To get oriented, we start with linear
neural networks. Linear nets provide a simple but nontrivial
worked example. They are not convex. Their energy landscapes
and dynamics under backpropagation have been extensively
studied and turn out to be surprisingly intricate [73], [74].
2.1 Neural networks
Consider a neural network with L − 1 hidden layers. Let
h0 := x denote the input to the network. For each layer
l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, set al = Wl · hl−1 and hl = s(al) where s
is a (typically nonlinear) function applied coordinatewise. Let
W := {W1, . . . ,WL} denote the set of weight matrices. A
convenient shorthand for the output of the network is fW(x).
For simplicity, suppose the output layer consists in a single
unit and the output is a scalar (the assumption is dropped in
section 3). Let (x(i), y(i))ni=1 denote a sample of labeled data
and let ℓ(f, y) be a loss function that is convex in the first
argument. Training the neural network reduces to solving the
optimization problem
W∗ = argmin
W
E
(x,y)∼Pˆ
[
ℓ
(
fW(x), y
)]
, (1)
4where Pˆ is the empirical distribution over the data. Training is
typically performed using gradient descent
W←W − E
(x,y)∼Pˆ
[
η · ∇W ℓ
(
fW(x), y
)]
. (2)
Since Eq. (1) is not a convex function of W, there are no
guarantees that gradient descent will find the global minimum.
2.1.1 Backprop
Let us recall how backprop is extracted from gradient descent.
Subscripts now refer to units, not layers. Setting E := E[ℓ],
Eq. (2) can be written more concretely for a single weight as
wij ← wij − η · ∂E
∂wij
.
By the chain rule the derivative decomposes as ∂E
∂wij
= ∂E
∂aj
∂aj
∂wij
where δj =
∂E
∂aj
is the backpropagated error. Backprop com-
putes δj recursively via
∂E
∂aj︸︷︷︸
δj
=
∑
{k:j→k}
δk︷︸︸︷
∂E
∂ak
·∂ak
∂aj︸ ︷︷ ︸
δj
=
∑
{k:j→k}
δk · wjkh′j
︸ ︷︷ ︸
δj
(3)
2.2 Linear networks
In a linear network, the function s is the identity. It follows that
the output of the network is
f(x) = fW(x) =
(
L∏
l=1
Wl
)
· x.
For linear networks, the backpropagation computation in
Eq. (3) reduces to
δj =
∑
{k:j→k}
δk · wjk (4)
It is convenient for our purposes to decompose δj slightly
differently, by factorizing it into ∂E
∂f
, the derivative of the loss
with respect to the output, and ∂f
∂aj
, the sensitivity of the
network’s output to unit j:
δj =
∂E
∂aj
=
∂E
∂f
· ∂f
∂aj︸ ︷︷ ︸
δj
We now reformulate the forward- and back- propagation in
linear nets in terms of path-sums [34], [72]:
Definition 1 (path-sums in linear nets).
A path is a directed-sequence of edges connecting two units. Let
(i  j) denote the set of paths from unit i to unit j. The weight of
a path weight(ρ) is the product of the weights of the edges along the
path.
• sum(paths from i to j):
σi j :=
∑
ρ∈(i j)
weight(ρ)
• sum(paths from in to j):
σ• j :=
∑
s∈in
xs ·

 ∑
ρ∈(s j)
weight(ρ)


• sum(paths from j to out):
σj • :=
∑
ρ∈(j •)
weight(ρ)
• sum(paths avoiding j):
σ−j :=
∑
s∈in
xs ·

 ∑
{ρ|ρ∈(s •) and j 6∈ρ}
weight(ρ)


Proposition 1 (structure of linear nets).
Let σin(j) = (σ• i){i:i→j} . For a linear network as above,
1) Feedforward computation of outputs.
The output of unit j is aj = σ• j = 〈wj ,σin(j)〉.
2) Sensitivity of network output.
The sensitivity of the network’s output to unit j, denoted ∂fW
∂aj
,
is the sum of the weights of all paths from unit j to the output
unit:
∂fW
∂aj
= σj •
3) Decomposition of network output.
The output of a linear network decomposes, with respect unit j,
as
fW(x) = 〈wj ,σin(j)〉 · σj • + σ−j = aj · σj • + σ−j
4) Backpropagated errors.
Let β := ∂E
∂f
denote the derivative of E with respect to the output
of the network. The backpropagated error signal received by unit
j is δj = β · σj out.
5) Error gradients.
Finally,
∇wj E = δj · σin(j) = β · σj • · σin(j)
Note that aj is a linear function of the weight vector wj of
unit j, and that neither the path-sums from j nor the path-sums
avoiding j depend on wj .
Proof. Direct computations.
The output of a linear neural network is a polynomial
function of its weights. This can be seen from the path-sum
perspective by noting that the output of a linear net is the sum
over all paths from the input layer to the output unit.
2.3 Game theory and online learning
In this subsection we reformulate linear neural networks as
convex games.
Definition 2 (convex game).
A convex game ([N ],H, ℓ) consists of a set [N ] := {1, . . . , N} of
players, actions H = ∏Nj=1Hj and loss vector ℓ = (ℓ1, . . . , ℓN ).
Player j picks actions wi from a convex compact set Hj ⊂ Rdj .
Player j’s loss ℓj : H → R is convex in the jth argument.
The classical games of von Neumann and Morgensten [66] are
a special case of convex games where Hi = △di is the probability
simplex over a finite set of actions [di] available to each agent i, and
the loss is multilinear.
It is well known that, even in the linear case, the loss of a
neural network is not a convex function of its weights or the
weights of its individual layers. However, the loss of a linear
network is a convex function of the weights of the individual
units.
5Proposition 2 (linear networks are convex games).
The players correspond to the units, where we impose that weight
vectors are chosen from compact, convexs set Hj ⊂ Rnj for each
unit j, where nj is the in-degree of unit j.
Let w−j denote the set of all weights in a neural network except
those of unit j. Define the loss of unit j as ℓj(wj ,w−j ,x, y) :=
ℓ(fW(x), y). Then ℓj is a convex function of wj for all j.
Proof. Note that the loss of every unit is the same and corre-
sponds to the loss of the network as a whole; the notation is
introduced to emphasize the relevant parameters. By proposi-
tion 1.3, the loss can be written
ℓj(wj ,w−j,x, y) = ℓ
(〈wj ,σin(j)〉 · σj • + σ−j , y),
where σin(j), σj • and σ−j are functions of w−j and x, and
so constant with respect to wj . It follows that the loss is the
composite of an affine function of wj with a convex function,
and so is convex.
Remark 1 (any neural network is a game).
Any neural network can be reformulated as a game by treating the
individual units as players. However, in general the loss will not be a
convex function of the players’ actions and so convergence guarantees
are not available. The main conceptual contribution of the paper is to
show that modern convnets form a class of games which, although not
convex, are close enough that convergence results from game theory
can be adapted to the setting.
As a concrete example, consider a network equipped with
the mean-square error. The loss of unit j is
ℓj(w) =
(
σj • · 〈wj ,σin(j)〉 −
(
y − σ−j
))2
.
Define the residue y−j :=
y−σ−j
σj •
. Unit j’s loss can be rewritten
ℓj(w) =
{
σ2j • ·
(〈wj ,σin(j)〉 − y−j)2 if σj • 6= 0
0 else.
Thus, unit j performs linear regression on the residue, am-
plified by a scalar that reflects the network’s sensitivity to j’s
output.
The goal of each player j in a game is to minimize its loss ℓj .
Unfortunately, this is not realistic, since ℓj(wj ,w−j) depends
on the actions of other players. If the game is repeated, then
an attainable goal is for players to minimize their regret. A
player’s cumulative regret is the difference between the loss
incurred over a series of plays and the loss that would have
been incurred had the player consistently chosen the best play
in hindsight:
Regretj(T ) = sup
wj∈Hj
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
ℓj(w
t
1, . . . ,w
t
j , . . . ,w
t
N)
−ℓj(wt1, . . . ,wj , . . . ,wtN)
)
.
An algorithm has no-regret if Regretj(T )
T−→∞ 0. That is, an
algorithm has no-regret (asymptotically) if Regretj(T ) grows
sublinearly in T . It is important to note that no-regret guaran-
tees hold against any sequence of actions by the other players in
the game – be they stochastic, adversarial, or something else.
A player with no-regret plays optimally given the actions of
the other players. Examples of no-regret algorithms on convex
losses include online gradient descent, the exponential weights
algorithm, follow the regularized leader, AdaGrad, and online
mirror descent.
It was observed by Foster and Vohra [75] that, if players
play according to no-regret online learning rules, then the
average of the sequence of plays converges to a correlated equi-
librium [76]. Proposition 3 below shows a more general result:
no-gated-regret algorithms converge to correlated equilibrium
at a rate that depends on the gated-regret.
Let us briefly recall the relevant notion of correlated equi-
librium. A distribution P ∈ △H is an ǫ-coarse correlated
equilibrium if, for every player j, it holds that
E
w∼P
[
ℓj(w)
]
≤ inf
wj∈Hj
E
w∼P
[
ℓj
(
wj ,w−j
)]
+ ǫ. (5)
When ǫ = 0 we refer to a coarse correlated equilibrium. The
ǫ-term in Eq. (5) quantifies the deviation of P from a coarse
correlated equilibrium [77]. The notion of correlated equilib-
rium is weaker than Nash equilibrium. The set of correlated
equilibria contains the convex hull of the set of Nash equilibria
as a subset.
We thus have two perspectives on linear nets: as networks
or as games. To train a network, we use algorithms such as
gradient descent implemented via backpropagation. To play a
game, the players use no-regret algorithms. Sections 3 and 4
show the two perspectives are equivalent in the more general
setting of modern convnets. In particular, correlated equilib-
ria games map to critical points of energy landscapes. Our
strategy is then to convert results about the convergence of
convex games to correlated equilibria into results about the
convergence of backpropagation on neural nets.
3 GATED GAMES AND CONVOLUTIONAL NETWORKS
This section presents a detailed analysis of rectifier nets. The
key observation is that rectifiers act as gates, which leads
directly to gated games. Gates games are not convex. However,
they are close enough that results on convergence to correlated
equilibria can easily be adapted to the setting.
The main technical work of the section is to introduce no-
tation to handle the interaction between path-sums and gates.
Path-sum games are then introduced as a class of gated games
capturing the dynamics of rectifier nets, see proposition 5.
Finally, we show how to extend the results to convnets.
3.1 Rectifier networks
Historically, neural networks typically used sigmoid σ(a) =
1
1+e−a or tanh τ(a) =
ea−e−a
ea+e−a nonlinearities. Alternatives were
investigated by Jarrett et al in [11], who found that rectifiers
ρ(a) = max(0, a) often perform much better than sigmoids in
practice. Rectifiers are now the default nonlinearity in convnets
[12]–[16]. There are many variants on the theme, including
noisy rectifers, ρN (a) = max(0, a + N(0, σ(a)), and leaky
rectifers
ρL(a) =
{
a if a > 0
0.01a else
introduced in [12] and [14] respectively.
63.1.1 Rectifiers gate error backpropagation
The rectifier is convex and differentiable except at a = 0, with
subgradient
1(a) =
dρ
da
=
{
1 if a ≥ 0
0 else.
The subgradient acts as an indicator function, which motivates
the choice of notation. Substituting 1j for h
′
j in the recursive
backprop computation, Eq. (3), yields
δj =
∂ℓ
∂aj
=
∑
{k:j→k}
δk · wjk · 1j (6)
Rectifiers act as gates: the only difference between backprop in
a linear network, Eq. (4), and a rectifier network, Eq. (6), is
that some units are zeroed out during both the forward and
backward sweeps. In the forward sweep, rectifiers zero out
units which would have produced negative outputs; on the
backward sweep, the rectifier subgradients zero out the exact
same units by acting as indicator functions.
Zeroed out (or inactive) units do not contribute to the feed-
forward sweep and do not receive an error signal during back-
propagation. In effect, the rectifiers select a linear subnetwork of
active units for use during forward and backpropagation.
3.2 Gated Games
We have seen that linear networks are convex games. Extend-
ing the result to rectifier networks requires generalizing convex
games to the setting where only a subset of players are active
on each round.
Definition 3 (gated games).
Let P(S) denote the powerset of S. A gated game ([N ],H, ℓ,A)
is a convex game equipped with a gate A : H → P([N ]). Players
j ∈ A(w1:N ) are active. Inactive players incur no loss. Each active
player incurs a convex loss ℓj : HA(w1:N ) → R, that depends on its
action and the actions of the other active players; i.e. HA(w1:N ) :=∏
j∈A(w1:N )Hj . Inactive players do not incur a loss.
The gated forecaster setting formalizes the perspective of a
player in a gated game:
Setting 1: GATED FORECASTER
input: Set E of other players
initialize w1 ∈ H
for rounds t = 1, 2, . . . do
Active players Et ⊂ E reveal actions xtE := {xti}i∈Et
if gate(wt ,xt) then
Environment reveals convex ℓt
Forecaster incurs loss ℓt
(
wt,xtE
)
Forecaster updates weights
wt+1 ←− weight(wt,xtE , ℓt)
else
Forecaster inactive; no loss incurred
Weights remain unchanged wt+1 ←− wt
In neural nets, rectifier functions, max-pooling, and dropout
all act as forms of gates that control (deterministically or
probabilistically) whether units actively respond to an input.
Importantly, inactive units do not receive any error under
backpropagation, as discussed in section 3.1.
In the gated setting, players only experience regret with
respect to their actions when active. We therefore introduce
gated-regret:
GRegret(T ) =
1
Ti

 ∑
{t∈[T ]:i∈A(wt)}
ℓti(w
t
i ,w
t
−i)
− sup
wi∈Hi
∑
{t∈[T ]:i∈A(wt)}
ℓt(wi,w
t
−i)

 ,
where Ti := |{t ∈ [T ] : i ∈ A(wt)}| is the number of rounds in
which player i is active.
Remark 2 (permanently inactive units).
If a player is permanently inactive then, trivially, it has no gated-
regret. This suggests there is a loophole in the definition that players
can exploit. We make two comments. Firstly, players do not control
when they are inactive. Rather, they optimize over the rounds they
are exposed to.
Secondly, in practice, some units in rectifier networks do become
inactive. The problem is mild: rectifier nets still outperform other
architectures. Reducing the number of inactive units was one of the
motivations for maxout units [78].
The next step is to extend correlated equilibrium to gated
games. The intuition behind correlated equilibrium is that a
signal P(w) is sent to all players which guides their behavior.
However, inactive players do not observe the signal. The signal
received by player j when active is the conditional distribution
Pj := P
(
w|j ∈ A(w)) =
{
P(w)
P({w|j∈A(w)}) if j ∈ A(w)
0 else.
The following proposition extends the result that no-regret
learning leads to coarse correlated equilibria from convex to
gated games:
Proposition 3 (no gated-regret→ correlated equilibrium).
LetG = ([N ],H, ℓ,A) be a gated game and suppose that the players
follow strategies with gated-regret ≤ ǫ. Then, the empirical distribu-
tion Pˆ of the actions played is an ǫ-coarse correlated equilibrium.
The rate at which the gated-regret of the players decay thus
controls the rate of convergence to a correlated equilibrium.
Proof. We adapt a theorem for two-player convex games by
Hazan and Kale in [79] to our setting. Since player j has gated-
regret ≤ ǫ, it follows that
1
Tj
∑
{t∈[T ]:j∈A(wt)}
(
ℓj(w
t)− ℓj
(
wj ,w
t
−j
)) ≤ ǫ ∀wj ∈ Hj .
The empirical distribution Pˆj assigns probability
1
Tj
to each
joint action wt occurring while player j is active. We can
therefore rewrite the above inequality as
E
w∼Pˆj
[
ℓj(w)
]
− E
w∼Pˆj
[
ℓj
(
wj ,w−j
)] ≤ ǫ ∀wj ∈ Hj
and the result follows.
3.3 Path-Sum Games
Let G be a directed acyclic graph corresponding to a rectifier
neural network with N units that are not input units. We
provide an alternate description of the dynamics of the feedfor-
ward and feedback sweep on the neural net in terms of path-
sums. The definitions are somewhat technical; the underlying
7intuition can be found in the discussions of linear and rectifier
networks above.
Let dj := |{i : i → j}| denote the indegree of node j.
Every edge is assigned a weight. In addition, each source node s
(with no incoming edges) is assigned a weight ws. The weights
assigned to source nodes are used to encode the input to the
neural net.
Recall that given path ρ, we write ρ ∈ (j  k) if ρ starts
at node j and finishes at node k. Given a set of nodes A, write
ρ ⊂ A if all the nodes along ρ are elements of A.
Definition 4 (path-sums in rectifier nets).
The weight of a path is the product of the weights of the edges along
the path. If a path starts at a source node s, then ws is included in
the product.
Given a set of nodes A and a node j, the path-sum σA• j is the
sum of the weights of all paths in A from source nodes to j:
σA• j :=
∑
s∈source
∑
{ρ | ρ⊂A and ρ∈(s j)}
weight(ρ).
By convention, σA• j is zero if no such path exists (for example, if
j 6∈ A).
The set A of active units is defined inductively on κ, which
tracks the length of the longest path from source units to a given
unit:
Let Aκ = {active units with longest path from a source ≤ κ}.
Source units are always active, so set A0 = {all source units}.
Suppose unit j has source-path-length κ + 1 and elements in Aκ
have been identified. Then, j is active if it corresponds to
• a linear unit or
• a rectifier with σAκ∪{j}• j > 0.
For simplicity we suppress that A is a function of weights
from the notation. It is also convenient to drop the superscript
A via the shorthand ς• j := σA• j .
The following proposition connects active path-sums to the
feedforward and feedback sweeps in a neural network:
Proposition 4 (structure of rectifier nets).
Let wj = (wi){i:i→j} and ς in(j) := (ς• i){i:i→j} . Further,
introduce notation ςout = (ςo)o∈out for the output layer. Then
1. Feedforward outputs.
If inputs to the network are encoded in source weights as above
then the output of unit j in the neural network is ςj . Specifically,
if j is linear then ς• j = 〈wj , ς in(j)〉; if j is a rectifier then
ς• j = max(0, 〈wj , ς in(j)〉).
2. Decomposition of network output.
Let ςj • denote the sum of active path weights from j to the
output layer. The output of the network decomposes as
ςout =
{
ςj • ·
〈
wj , ς in(j)
〉
+ σ
A\{j}
out if player j active
σ
A\{j}
out else
whereσ
A\{j}
out is the sum over active paths from sources to outputs
that do not intersect j.
3. Backpropagated errors.
Suppose the network is equipped with error function ℓ(ςout,y).
Let g := ∇out ℓ(ςout,y) denote the gradient of ℓ. The backpropa-
gated error signal received by unit j is δj = 〈g, ςj •〉.
4. Error gradients.
Finally,〈∇wj ℓ(ςout,y),wj〉 = 〈g, ςout − σA\{j}out 〉
= 〈g, ςj out〉 ·
〈
wj , ςin(j)
〉
= δj · ς• j
Proof. Direct computation, paralleling proposition 1.
The output of a rectifier network is a piecewise polynomial
function of its weights. To see this, observe that the output of
a rectifier net is the sum over all active paths from the input
layer to the output unit, see also [34].
The next step is to construct a game played by the units of
the neural network. It turns out there are two ways of doing
so:
Definition 5 (path-sum games).
The set of players is {0} ∪ [N ]. The zeroth player corresponds to
the environment and is always active. The environment plays labeled
datapoints w0 = (wsource,y) ∈ R|source|+|label| and suffers no loss.
The remainingN players correspond to non-source units ofG. Player
j plays weight vector wj in compact convex Hj ⊂ Rdj .
The losses in the two games are:
• Path-sum prediction game (PS-Pred).
Player j incurs ℓj
(
w
)
:= ℓ(ςout,y) when active and no
loss when inactive.
• Path-sum gradient game (PS-Grad).
Player j incurs 〈∇ ℓj ,wj〉 when active, where ∇ ℓj :=
∇wj ℓj , and no loss when inactive.
PS-Pred and PS-Grad are analogs of prediction with ex-
pert advice and the hedge setting. In the hedge setting, players
receive linear losses and choose actions from the simplex; in
PS-Grad, players receive linear losses. The results below hold
for both games, although our primary interest is in PS-Pred.
Note that PS-Grad has the important property that the loss
of player j is a linear function of player j’s action when it is
active:
〈∇ ℓj,wj〉 =
{
δj · 〈wj , ςin(j)〉 if j active
0 else.
Finally, observe that the regret when playing PS-Grad upper
bounds PS-Pred, since regret-bounds for linear losses are the
worst-case amongst convex losses.
Remark 3 (minibatch games).
It is possible to construct batch or minibatch games, by allowing
the environment to play sequences of moves on each round.
Proposition 5 (path-sum games are gated games).
PS-Pred and PS-Grad are gated games if the error function
ℓ(ςout,y) is convex in its first argument. That is, rectifier nets are
gated games.
The gating structure is essential; path-sum games are not
convex, even for rectifiers with the mean-squared error: com-
posing a rectifier with a quadratic can yield the nonconvex
function f(x) = (max(0, x) − 1)2. Even simpler, the negative
of a rectifier is not convex.
Proof. It is required to show that the losses under PS-Pred and
PS-Grad, that is ℓj and 〈∇ ℓj ,wj〉, are convex functions of wj
when player j is active. Clearly each loss is a scalar-valued
function.
8By proposition 4.2, when player j is active the network loss
has the form
ℓj(w) = ℓ
(
ςj • ·
〈
wj, ς in(j)
〉
+ σ
A\{j}
out ,y
)
= ℓ
(
c1 ·
〈
wj , ς in(j)
〉
+ c2,y
)
.
The terms ςj • , ς in(j) and σ
A\{j}
out are all constants with respect
to wj . Thus, the network loss is an affine transformation of
wj (dot-product followed by multiplication by a constant and
adding a constant) composed with a convex function, and so
convex.
By proposition 4.4, the gradient loss has the form
∇wj ℓj(w) = 〈g, ςj out〉 · ςin(j) = c1 · ςin(j)
when player j is active – which is linear in wj since all the
other terms are constants with respect to wj .
Remark 4 (dependence of loss on other players).
We have shown that it is a convex function of player j’s action, when
player j is active. Note that: (i) the loss of player j depends on the
actions chosen by other players in the game and (ii) the loss is not
a convex function of the joint-action of all the players. It is for these
reasons that the game-theoretic analysis is essential.
The proposition does not merely hold for toy cases.
The next section extends the result to maxout units,
DropOut, DropConnect, and convolutional networks with
shared weights and max-pooling. Proposition 5 thus applies
to convolutional networks as they are used in practice. Finally,
note that proposition 5 does not hold for leaky rectifier units
[14] or units that are not piecewise linear, such as sigmoid or
tanh.
3.4 Convolutional Networks
We extend proposition 5 from rectifier nets to convnets.
Proposition 6 (convnets are gated games).
Let N be a convolutional network with any combination of linear,
rectifier, maxout and max-pooling units. Then, N is a gated game.
The proof consists in identifying the relevant players and
gates for each case (maxout units, max-pooling, weight-tying
in convolutional layers, dropout and dropconnect) in turn. We
sketch the result below.
3.4.1 Maxout units
Maxout units were introduced in [78] to deal with the problem
that rectifier units sometimes saturate at zero resulting in
them being insufficiently active and to complement dropout.
A maxout unit has kj weight vectorswj,1, . . . ,wj,kj ∈ Rdj and,
given input fj ∈ Rdj , outputs
maxout: m(fj) := max
c∈[kj]
〈
wj,c, fj
〉
Construct a new graph, G˜, which has: one node per input,
linear and rectifier unit; and kj nodes per maxout unit. Players
correspond to nodes of G˜ and are denoted by greek letters.
The extended graph inherits its edge structure from G: there is
a connection between players α → β in G˜ iff the underlying
units in G are connected. Path weights and path-sums are
defined exactly as before, except that we work on G˜ instead
of G. The definition of active units is modified as follows:
The set A of active players for maxout units is defined
inductively. Let Ak = {active players with longest source-path
≤ k}. Source players are active (k = 0).
Player β with source-path-length k + 1 is active if
• it corresponds to a linear unit; or
• a rectifier with σAk∪{β}β > 0; or
• a maxout unit with σAk∪{β}β > σ
Ak∪{α}
α for all α
corresponding to the same maxout unit.
3.4.2 Max-pooling
Max-pooling is heavily used in convnets to as a form of dimen-
sionality reduction. Amax-pooling unit j has no parameters and
outputs the maximum of the outputs of the units from which
it receives inputs:
max-pooling: max
{i:i→j}
σAi
Gates can be extended to max-pooling by adding the condition
that, to be active, the output of unit i must be greater than any
other unit i′ that feeds (directly) into the same pooling unit.
A unit may thus produce an output and still count as
inactive because it is ignored by the max-pooling layer, and so
has no effect on the output of the neural network. In particular,
units that are ignored by max-pooling do not update their
weights under backpropagation.
3.4.3 Convolutional layers
Units in a convolutional layer share weights. Obversely to
maxout units, each of which corresponds to many players,
weight-sharing units correspond to a single composite player.
Suppose that rectifier units j1, . . . , jL share weight vector
wj . Let A<j denote active players in lower layers and define
Aj :=
{
α ∈ [L] :
〈
wj ,σ
A<j
in(jα)
〉
> 0
}
Component α in layer j is active if α ∈ Aj . Notice that,
since players correspond to many units, two players may be
connected by more than one edge. Player j is active if any of
its components is active, i.e. if |Aj | > 0. The output of player j
is the sum of its active components:
ςj =
〈
wj,
∑
α∈Aj
σ
A<j
in(jα)
〉
.
The loss incurred by player j is per Definition 5.
3.4.4 Dropout and Dropconnect
In training with dropout [5], units become inactive with some
probability (typically 12 ) during training. In other words, there
is a stochastic component to whether or not a player is active.
Gated games are easily extended to incorporate dropout by
allowing gates to switch off stochastically. That is, the gating
function takes values in the set of distributions over the set of
units, A : H → P(units(G)), from which the active units are
sampled.
Dropconnect is a refinement of dropout where connections,
instead of units, are dropped out during training [80]. Drop-
connect requires extending the notion of gate so that its range is
distributions over subsets of edges instead of subsets of units:
A : H → P(edges(G)).
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We now explore some implications of the connection between
path-sum games and deep learning. Theorem 1 shows that the
convergence rates of gated forecasters in a path-sum game (that
is, a rectifier net or convnet) controls the convergence rate of
the network as a whole. As an immediate corollary, we obtain
the first convergence rates for gradient descent on rectifier nets.
A second corollary, that is of more conceptual than practical
importance, shows that the signal underpinning the correlated
equilibrium can be used to describe the representation learned
by the neural network. Finally, we present an algorithm with
logarithmic regret.
4.1 A local-to-global convergence guarantee
Our main result is that gated-regret controls the rate of con-
vergence to critical points in rectifier convnets with a loss
function that is convex in the output of the net. The result holds
assuming weight vectors are restricted to compact convex sets.
Weights are not usually hard-constrained when training neural
networks although they are frequently regularized. Hinton has
recently argued that the weights of rectifier layers quickly
stabilise on similar values, suggesting this is not an issue in
practice.3
It is important to note that the theorem applies to con-
volutional nets as used in practice. Rectifiers have replaced
sigmoids as the nonlinearity of choice as they consistently yield
better empirical performance. Loss functions are convex in
almost all applications: the logistic loss, hinge loss, and mean-
squared error are all convex functions of output weights.
Theorem 1 (local-to-global convergence guarantee).
LetN be a rectifier convnet trained by using backpropagation to com-
pute gradients and a no-regret algorithm (such as gradient descent,
Adagrad, mirror descent) to update weights given the gradients.
Let GRegretj(T ) denote the gated-regret of player j after T
rounds. Then, the empirical distribution PˆT of the weights arising
during training network N over T rounds converges to a correlated
equilibrium. That is,
E
w∼PˆT
j
[
ℓj(w)
] ≤ min
wj∈Hj
E
w∼PˆT
j
[
ℓj(wj ,w−j)] + GRegretj(T )
(7)
for all players j. Consequently, the gated regret of the players controls
the rate of convergence of backpropagation to critical points when
training rectifier nets.
An important class of games, introduced by Monderer and
Shapley in [81], is potential games. A game is a potential game if
the loss functions of all the players arise from a single function,
referred to as the potential function. Rectifier nets are gated
potential games where the potential function is the loss of the
network. That is, the loss incurred by each player, when active,
is the loss of the network. Potential games are more amenable
to analysis and computation than general games. Local minima
of the potential function are pure Nash equilibria. Moreover,
simple algorithms such as fictitious play and regret-matching
converge to Nash equilibria in potential games [82], [83].
Proof. Propositions 3, 5 and 6 together imply Eq. (7).
The output fW(x) of a neural net is a continuous piece-
wise polynomial function of its weights, recall remark after
prop 4. The potential function ℓ(fW(x),y) of a neural net is
3. For example, see http://bit.ly/1KN8e85 starting at 24:00
the composite of a piecewise polynomial and convex function.
It follows that no-regret algorithms will either converge to
a point where the gradient is zero or to a point where the
gradient does not exist. Thus, the network converges to a
correlated equilibrium that is a Dirac distribution concentrated
on a critical point of the loss function.
The theorem provides the first rigorous justification for
applying convex methods to convnets: although they are not
convex, individual units perform convex optimizations when
active. The theorem provides a generic conversion from regret-
guarantees for convex methods to convergence rates for recti-
fier networks. Corollaries 1 and 3 provide algorithms for which
GRegret(T ) ≤ O( 1√
Tactive
) and GRegret(T ) ≤ O( log Tactive
Tactive
)
respectively.
4.2 Gradient descent
A special case of theorem 1 is when the no-regret algorithm is
gradient descent, see algorithm 1. The algorithm differs from
standard backpropagation by introducing a projection step
ProjHj (w
′) := argmin
w∈Hj
‖w−w′‖22
that forces the updated weight to lie in the set of actions
available to player j. If the diameter of Hj is sufficiently large
then the projection step makes no practice. It can be thought
of as analogous to gradient clipping, which is sometimes used
when training neural nets.
Corollary 1 (convergence for gradient descent).
Suppose a neural network has a loss function that is convex in its
output. Suppose that Hj ⊂ Rdj has diameter D. Further suppose
that that the backpropagated errors received by j and the inputs to j
are bounded bymaxt |δtj | ≤ B andmaxt ‖ςtin(j)‖ ≤ G respectively.
Then unit j’s gated-regret under online gradient descent is
bounded by
GRegretBackprop(T ) ≤
3
2
DGB
1√
Tj
where Tj ≤ T is the number of rounds where j is active.
The learning rate in algorithm 1 decays according to the
number of active steps tj rather than the number of steps t.
An important insight of the gated-game formulation is that
learning only occurs on active rounds.
Proof. By Lemma 4, weight updates under error backpropaga-
tion coincide with players performing online gradient descent,
when active, on either loss in Definition 5. The gradient∇wj ℓj
depends on player j’s input, upper bounded by G, and its
backpropagated error, upper bounded by B. The result follows
from a standard analysis of online gradient descent [84].
The bound is a function of constants, B and G, that depend
on the behavior of other units in the neural net. The depen-
dence arises for any gradient descent based algorithm where
the weight updates depend on the backpropagated error. The
corollary precisely characterises the dependence.
4.3 Signals and representations
Recall that a correlated equilibrium requires a signal to guide
the behavior of the players. In the case of a rectifier net, the rel-
evant signal is the emprical distribution over the joint actions
of the players. As a corollary of theorem 1, we show that the
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Algorithm 1: BACKPROP (ERROR BACKPROPAGATION)
input: Learning rates {ηt = D
BG
√
tj
}
Pick w1 in Hj
for rounds t = 1, 2, . . . do
Input xt revealed
if gate(wt ,xt) then
Backpropagated error δt revealed
wt+1 ←− ProjHj (wt − ηt · δt · xt)
signal provides a compact description of the representations
learned by deep networks. There is thus a direct connection
between correlated equilibria and representation learning.
Given a distribution P on the set H of joint actions (recall
that a joint action in PS-Pred specifies the input to the net-
work, its label, and every weight vector), define the expected
gain of player j as
gain: Gj(wj ;P) := E
w−j∼P
[
− ℓj
(
wj ,w−j
)]
, (8)
where w−j is moves by players other than j. Note that in
Eq. (8), the moves of all players except j are drawn from P,
which determines which players are active; player j’s move (if
active) is treated as a free variable.
Let Pˆt denote the empirical distribution – or signal in game-
theoretic terminology – on joint actions up to round t of a
neural network trained by error backpropagation, and Pˆtj the
empirical signal observered by player j. For notational conve-
nience, it is useful to incorporate the learning rate, number of
rounds and initial weight vector into the gain, and define
Gˆj(wj) := ηTj ·Gj(w; Pˆj) + 〈wj ,w1j 〉, (9)
where Tj is the number of rounds where unit j is active. We
then have
Corollary 2 (signals↔ representations).
Construct the empirical gain Gˆj of unit j after T rounds from the
signal (empirical distribution) per (9). Then if a rectifier net imple-
ments gradient descent with fixed learning rate η and unconstrained
weights, it holds that
• unit j’s weight vector at time T + 1 is the gradient of the
gain:
wT+1j = ∇j Gˆj
• the output of unit j on round T + 1 is the directional
derivative of the gain w.r.t. j’s input:
ςT+1j =
{
D
ς
T+1
in(j)
Gˆj if positive
0 else.
Corollary 2 succinctly describes the representations learned
by a neural network via the game-theoretic notation developed
above. The corollary does not eliminate the complexity of deep
representations. Rather, it demonstrates their direct depen-
dence on the empirical signal Pˆ, which is itself an extremely
complicated object.
4.4 Logarithmic convergence
As a second application of theorem 1, we adapt the Online
Newton Step (ONS) algorithm [46] to neural networks, see
NProp in Algorithm 2. Newton’s method is computationally
expensive since it involves inverting the Hessian. In particular,
Online Newton Step scales as O(n4) where n is the dimension
[85]. Moreover, quasi-newton method tends to converge on
saddle points. A naive implementation of a quasi-newton
method in neural networks based on the global hessian is
therefore problematic: the number of parameters is huge; and
saddle points are abundant [33], [86].
The NProp algorithm sidesteps both problems since it is
implemented unit-wise. The computational cost is reduced,
since an approximation to a local Hessian is computed for each
unit. Thus, the computational cost scales as quadratically with
the largest layer, rather than with the network. Similarly, since
NProp is implemented unit-wise, the Newton-approximation
is not exposed to curvature of the neural net. Instead, NProp
simultaneously leverages the linear structure of active path-
sums and the exp-concave structure (curvature) of the external
loss.
LetH ⊂ Rd be a non-empty compact convex set. A function
f : H → R is α-exp-concave if e−αf(w) is a concave function of
w ∈ H. Many commonly used loss functions are exp-concave,
including the mean-squared error, (〈w,x〉 − y)2, the log loss,
− log〈w,x〉, and the logistic loss, log(1+e−y〈w,x〉), for suitably
restricted w,x and y.
Recall that
ProjH,A(w) := argmin
v∈H
〈
v −w,A · (v −w)〉.
Given vectors u and v, let u⊗v denote their outerproduct.
If u and v are m and n dimensional respectively then u⊗ v is
a (m× n)-matrix.
Corollary 3 (NProp has logarithmic gated-regret).
Suppose that a neural network has loss function ℓ that is α-exp-
concave in its output. Suppose that Hj ⊂ Rdj has diameter D.
Further suppose that the backpropagated errors and inputs to j are
bounded by maxt |δt| ≤ B and maxt ‖xt‖ ≤ G respectively.
Then, unit j’s gated-regret under NProp is bounded by
GRegretNProp(T ) ≤ 5dj
(
1
α
+BDG
)
logTj
Tj
where Tj ≤ T is the number of rounds that j is active and dj is its
indegree.
We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let f : X → R be an α-exp-concave function. Suppose
thatH ⊂ Rn is a nonempty compact convex set with diam(H) = D,
and that A and b are a (d × n)-matrix and a d-vector satisfying
A · H + b ⊂ X . Suppose that maxx∈X ‖A⊺∇ f(x)‖ ≤ E.
Define g : H → R as g(w) := f(Aw + b). If β ≤
1
2 min{ 14DE , α} then for all w,v ∈ H it holds that
g(v) ≥ g(w) + 〈∇ g(w),v −w〉
+
β
2
〈w− v,∇ g(w)⊗∇ g(w) · (w − v)〉 .
Proof. It is shown in Lemma 3 of [46] that, since f is α-exp-
concave and 2β ≤ α,
f(x)− 1
2β
log
(
1− 2β〈∇ f(x),y − x〉) ≤ f(y). (10)
By the chain rule, ∇ g(w) = A⊺∇ f(x), and so Eq. (10) can be
rewritten as
g(w)− 1
2β
log
(
1− 2β〈∇ g(w),v −w〉) ≤ g(v).
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By construction, |2β〈∇ g(w),v−w〉| ≤ 14 and the result follows
by the reasoning in [46].
We are now ready to prove the Theorem.
Proof. The proof follows the same logic as Theorem 2 in [46]
after replacing Lemma 3 there with our Lemma 1. We omit
details, except to show how the setting of Lemma 1 connects to
neural networks. Let
xt := ςtin(j), π
t := ςtj out and b
t := σ
A\{j}
out .
Let the (d ×m)-dimensional matrix At := πt ⊗ (xt)⊺ denote
the outer product. By Lemma 4.2,
ς
t
out = A
t ·wtj + bt.
Since
A⊺∇ ℓ = xt · 〈πt,∇ ℓ〉 = δtj · xt,
we have that
‖A⊺∇ ℓ‖ ≤ |δtj | · ‖xt‖ ≤ BG,
and the remainder of the argument is standard.
To the best of our knowledge, NProp is the first logarithmic-
regret algorithm for neural networks. NProp is computation-
ally more efficient than 2nd order methods, since it does not
require computing the Hessian, and there are efficient ways
to iteratively compute (At)−1 without directly inverting the
matrix. Nevertheless, NProp’s memory usage and computa-
tional complexity are prohibitive [85]; it is worth investigating
whether there are more efficient algorithms that achieve loga-
rithmic regret in this setting, for example based on the Sketched
Online Newton algorithm proposed by Luo et al [87] which has
linear runtime. Finally, NProp does not take advantage of the
fact that some experts are inactive on each round, suggesting a
second direction in which it may be improved.
Algorithm 2: NPROP (NEWTON BACKPROPAGATION)
input: β ←− 12 min{ 14BGD , α}
A0 ←− 1
β2D2
Idj
Pick w1 in Hj
for rounds t = 1, 2, . . . do
Input xt revealed
if gate(wt ,xt) then
Backpropagated error δt revealed
At ←− At−1 + (δt)2 · xt ⊗ xt
wt+1 ←− ProjHj ,At
(
wt − δt
β
(At)−1xt
)
4.5 Conditional computation
Convnets are path-sum games played between gated convex
players. The criterion for activating a unit is either a max
operator (rectifiers, maxout units, and max-pooling) or random
(dropout and dropconnect). These have been shown to work
well in practice. It is nevertheless natural to question whether
they are optimal. This section introduces a framework to tackle
the question. Indeed
Analyzing and optimizing the gates requires a new kind of
player, Conditional Gate (CoG), that controls when players are
active. Conditional Gate experiences regret about not activing
the optimal subset of players. More precisely, a CoG activates
a subset of players F t ⊂ F on each round. The CoG’s context
is the weights of the players and their inputs. In PS-Pred, a
CoG incurs scalar loss ℓ(ςout,y). In PS-Grad, a CoG incurs
loss vector (∇ ℓti)i∈F t .
Setting 2: CONDITIONAL GATE (COG)
input: Set F of players
Function class F ⊂ {ϕ : C → P(F )}
for rounds t = 1, 2, . . . do
Weights (wti)i∈F and inputs (x
t
i)i∈F to players are
revealed
CoG activates subset F t ⊂ F of players
CoG incurs loss ℓt(F t)
The setting is a bandit or partial monitoring since the CoG
does not observe what the loss would have been had other
players been active. A CoG has access to a class of functions
F ⊂ {ϕ : C → P(F )} from contexts to sets of players. The
CoG’s regret and pseudo-regret are
Regret =
1
T
Emax
ϕ∈F
[
T∑
t=1
ℓt(F t)− ℓt(ϕ(ct))
]
and
PseudoRegret=
1
T
max
ϕ∈F
E
[
T∑
t=1
ℓt(F t)− ℓt(ϕ(ct))
]
,
where the expectation is over the CoG’s actions (which are
stochastic in general).
The next two examples sketch how to generalize rectifier
and maxout units using conditional gates.
Example 1 (rectifiers). Instead of using the max function to
activate a linear unit, equip it with a CoG that decides, on each
round, whether or not to activate the unit based on context (w,x). If
the unit is not woken, then CoG does not observe the loss. The setting
generalizes apple-tasting [88] to contextual partial monitoring.
Example 2 (maxout). Section 3.4 showed how to model a maxout
unit as k players. An adaptive-maxout unit is then k players with
a CoG that activates one of them on each round. The CoG is a
contextual bandit: players are levers; their weights and inputs are
context; the loss ℓ(ςout,y) is a scalar that depends on the choice of
active player.
There are currently no theoretically grounded off-the shelf
methods for contextual partial monitoring. However, an ef-
ficient contextual bandit algorithm for the stochastic setting
is provided in [89]. Recent work [47], [48] has implemented
conditional computation in neural nets using REINFORCE [90]
to train the policy. Although the approach has been shown to
work in practice, there are currently no performance guaran-
tees available. Developing a solid understanding of conditional
computation in neural nets is an important open problem.
5 CONCLUSION
The paper has initiated a game-theoretic analysis of convolu-
tional networks. The key observation is that the nonlinearities
found in modern convnets (rectifiers, maxout, max-pooling)
are gates that control whether or not the linear operations
performed by units contribute to the network’s output. Gated
games formalize the role of gating. Path-sum games succinctly
express the dynamics of convolutional networks. Reformu-
lating error backpropagation as a path-sum game yields the
12
first convergence rates for modern convnets. It also provides
a solid foundation on top of which ideas from online convex
optimization, game theory and deep learning can be combined.
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